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Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard
Siddharth Barman∗ Katrina Ligett†
Abstract
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that
natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many
players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time algorithms that compute exact (coarse) cor-
related equilibria. In light of these results, a natural question is how good are the (coarse)
correlated equilibria that can arise from any efficient algorithm or dynamics.
In this paper we address this question, and establish strong negative results. In particular,
we show that in multiplayer games that have a succinct representation, it is NP-hard to compute
any coarse correlated equilibrium (or approximate coarse correlated equilibrium) with welfare
strictly better than the worst possible. The focus on succinct games ensures that the underlying
complexity question is interesting; many multiplayer games of interest are in fact succinct. Our
results imply that, while one can efficiently compute a coarse correlated equilibrium, one cannot
provide any nontrivial welfare guarantee for the resulting equilibrium, unless P = NP. We show
that analogous hardness results hold for correlated equilibria, and persist under the egalitarian
objective or Pareto optimality.
To complement the hardness results, we develop an algorithmic framework that identifies
settings in which we can efficiently compute an approximate correlated equilibrium with near-
optimal welfare. We use this framework to develop an efficient algorithm for computing an
approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare in aggregative games.
1 Introduction
Equilibria are central solution concepts in game theory, and questions related to the complexity
of equilibrium computation have formed a major thread of research in algorithmic game theory.
Arguably the most important equilibrium concepts are the Nash equilibrium [19], correlated equi-
librium [2], and coarse correlated equilibrium [11]. These solution concepts denote distributions
over players’ action profiles at which no player can benefit by unilateral deviation, and hence rep-
resent stable choices of distributions over player actions. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium is defined
to be a product of independent distributions (one for each player); correlated and coarse correlated
equilibria are general (joint) probability distributions (see Section 2 for formal definitions).
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While computation of Nash equilibria has in recent years been shown to be computationally
hard, even in games with two players [8], the news for correlated equilibria (CE) and coarse corre-
lated equilibria (CCE) has been more positive. Even in games with many players, there exist a num-
ber of natural dynamics that quickly converge to these solution concepts (see, e.g., [17, 10, 12, 6]).
In particular, these dynamics induce efficient computation of approximate1 CE and CCE in multi-
player games; by contrast, computation of approximate Nash equilibria is computationally hard in
multiplayer games [22]. In fact, exact CE and CCE are efficiently computable in many classes of
multiplayer games [21, 14].
Another significant thread of research in algorithmic game theory has been the study of the
quality of equilibria, often as measured by the social welfare of the equilibrium or its ratio to the
social welfare of the socially optimal outcome (c.f. the extensive literature on the price of anarchy
(PoA) [20]). Given that we know it is possible to efficiently compute CE and CCE, it is natural
to ask how good are the equilibria we can efficiently compute? For example, do existing efficient
dynamics find the best such equilibria, or at least ones that approximately optimize the social
welfare? Since the gap between the worst and the best equilibria (CE or CCE), in terms of social
welfare, can be large in natural games (see, e.g., [16, 5]), it is interesting to understand if there
exist efficient dynamics or algorithms that avoid—at least to some extent—the bad outcomes. More
generally, one can pose the question of efficiently finding CE and CCE that optimize an objective
(such as the sum of players’ utilities, i.e., the social welfare).
In their notable work, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [21] show that determining a socially
optimal CE is NP-hard, in a number of succinct multiplayer games. This result intuitively follows
from the fact that determining an action profile with maximum welfare—i.e., solving the problem
of welfare optimization even without equilibrium constraints—is NP-hard in general. The hardness
result of [21] leaves open the question of computing near-optimal CE/CCE, i.e., whether there exist
efficient algorithms that compute CE/CCE with welfare at least, say, α times the optimal, for a
nontrivial approximation ratio α ≤ 1. This question forms the basis of the present work.
Technical Aside (succinct games): We note that in general multiplayer games the size of the
normal form representation, N , is exponentially large in the number of players; one can compute
a CE/CCE that optimizes a linear objective by solving a linear program of size polynomial in N ,
and hence the computational complexity of equilibrium computation is not interesting for general
games. However, most games of interest—such as graphical games, polymatrix games, congestion
games, local effect games, network design games, anonymous games, and scheduling games—admit
a succinct representation (wherein the above-mentioned linear program can be exponentially large
in the size of the representation), and hence it is such succinctly representable games that we (and
previous works) study.2
1A probability distribution over the players’ action profiles is said to be an ε-approximate equilibrium if for any
player unilaterally deviating increases utility, in expectation, by at most ε.
2Note that the optimization problem does not become simpler if, instead of a succinct game, one is given access
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Results In this paper we establish that, unless P = NP, there does not exist any efficient algo-
rithm that computes a CCE with welfare better than the worst possible CCE, in succinct multiplayer
games (Theorem 1). We also establish similar hardness results for computing equilibria under the
egalitarian objective or Pareto-optimality.
Analogous hardness results hold for CE. We note that a classical interpretation of a CE is
in terms of a mediator who has access to the players’ payoff functions and who draws outcomes
from a correlated equilibrium’s joint distribution over player actions and privately recommends the
corresponding actions to each player. The equilibrium conditions ensure that no player can benefit
in expectation by unilaterally deviating from the recommended actions. Therefore, the problem
we study here is exactly the computational complexity of the problem that a mediator faces if she
wishes to maximize social welfare.
We also extend the hardness result to approximate CE and CCE (Theorem 3). Therefore, while
one can efficiently compute an approximate CE/CCE in succinct multiplayer games, one cannot
provide any nontrivial welfare guarantees for the resulting equilibrium (unless P = NP).
In addition, we show that this hardness result also holds specifically for potential games (gen-
erally considered to be a very tractable class of games), and persists even in settings where the gap
between the best and worst equilibrium is large.
We note that in these results, the hardness is not simply borrowed from welfare maximization;3
even if the underlying game admits a nontrivial multiplicative approximation for welfare maxi-
mization, the problem of determining a CCE with welfare arbitrarily better than the worst CCE
remains hard. Another relevant observation is that there always exists an optimal CE/CCE with
support size polynomial in the number of players and the number of actions per player.4 Therefore,
the fact that in multiplayer games there might exist CE/CCE with exponentially large support size
does not, in and of itself, account for the complexity of this problem.
We complement these hardness results by developing an algorithmic framework for computing an
ε-approximate CE with welfare that is additively ε close to the optimal. This framework establishes
a sufficient condition under which the above-mentioned complexity barriers can be circumvented.
In particular, we show that if in a given game we can efficiently obtain an additive approximation
for a modified-welfare maximization problem, then we can efficiently compute an approximate CE
with high welfare. The modified welfare under consideration can be thought of as a Lagrangian
corresponding to the equilibrium constraints (see Definition 7), and the modified-welfare maxi-
mization problem entails finding an action profile that maximizes this modified welfare. Note that
to a game via a black box which, when given an action profile a as a query, returns the utilities of all the players at
a.
3Welfare maximization refers to the optimization problem of finding an action profile (not necessarily an equilib-
rium) with maximum possible welfare.
4This follows from the fact that CE/CCE are defined by a polynomial number of linear constraints. That is, the
set of CE/CCE form a polytope that is defined by a polynomial number of linear inequalities. An optimal CE/CCE
is an extreme point of this polytope, and hence its support size is polynomially bounded.
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even if welfare (specified by the given utilities) is nonnegative, modified welfare can be negative for
certain action profiles. This notably differentiates welfare maximization and modified-welfare max-
imization, and provides an idea of the technical challenges that one faces when approximating the
modified-welfare maximization problem. (Recall that typical multiplicative-approximation tech-
niques cannot handle negative quantities.) Hence, in a given game, the problem of (nontrivially)
approximating the modified-welfare maximization problem can be hard, even if the game admits a
nontrivial multiplicative-approximation for welfare maximization.
Further, we instantiate this algorithmic framework to compute high-welfare approximate CE
in aggregative games. These are games wherein the utility of each player is a function of her own
action and an aggregate (a constant-dimensional summary vector) of all players’ actions; see Sec-
tion 4.1 for a formal definition. Aggregative games encompass settings like Cournot oligopolies,
Bertrand competitions, weighted congestion games, and anonymous games [13, 1, 3, 9]. We de-
velop an efficient additive-approximation algorithm for the modified-welfare maximization problem
in aggregative games. Therefore, via the above-mentioned framework, we show how to efficiently
compute a high-welfare approximate CE in aggregative games.
Related Work Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [21] showed that the problem of computing an
exactly optimal CE is NP-hard for many relevant classes of multiplayer games, including congestion
games, graphical games, polymatrix games, local effect games, and scheduling games. Specific
instances in which the hardness result of [21] can be completely circumvented, i.e., settings where
an exactly optimal CE can be efficiently computed, were identified by Jiang and Leyton-Brown [14].
The results in [21] and [14] leave open the question of efficiently computing a CE with near-optimal
welfare, i.e., the question of approximating the optimization problem under consideration. The
complexity of this approximation is the focus of our work.
Our main result is negative. In order to prove a positive result for the specific case of computing
near-optimal approximate CE in aggregative games, we consider a modified-welfare maximization
problem (MWMP); see Section 4 for a formal definition. Jiang and Leyton Brown [14] consider
classes of games in which the MWMP can be solved optimally, and use the ellipsoid method to find
an optimal CE. In our setting, exactly solving the MWMP is not computationally feasible (and
hence the framework of [14] cannot be applied to aggregative games5), but we show that an additive
approximation of MWMP suffices to find a near-optimal approximate CE. This entails developing
a new algorithm that does not rely on the ellipsoid method.
There is prior work [7, 15, 4] on dynamics that quickly converge to high-welfare CCE in isolated,
specific classes of games, such as fair cost sharing games; our results show that it is unlikely that
such results can be significantly generalized. Marden et al. [18] develop dynamics that eventually
converge to Pareto-optimal CCE (see also [23]); these works do not establish polynomial rate of
5Knapsack reduces to the problem of welfare maximization in aggregative games.
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convergence for the proposed dynamics.
2 Notation
In this paper we consider games with n players and m actions per player. We use Ap to denote the
set of actions available to the pth player and A to denote the set of action profiles, A :=
∏
pAp.
We write up : A → [0, 1] for the (normalized) utility of player p, and w : A → R is the welfare of
an action profile, w(a) :=
∑n
p=1 up(a).
6 For an action profile a ∈ A, let a−p denote the profile of
actions chosen by players other than p. With A−p :=
∏
q 6=pAq, we have a−p ∈ A−p.
As is typical in the literature, we say that a game is succinct if it has an efficient representation.
Formally, an n-player m-action game is said to be succinct if the player utilities are completely
specified via a polynomial-sized string from an input set I. Specifically, for a succinct game, there
exists a polynomial (in n and m) time algorithm U that, given a representation z ∈ I along with a
player p and action profile a, returns the utility up(a) = U(z, p, a). The game is denoted by Γ(z).
Many important classes of multi-player games are succinct, e.g., symmetric games, anonymous
games, local effect games, congestion games, polymatrix games, graphical games, and network
design. This paper is focused on succinct games, since this lets us formally treat settings in which
the input, i.e., the utilities in the game, can be efficiently represented. Note that the hardness
question becomes moot if we consider the normal form representation of an n-player m-action
game as our “input,” since in this case the input itself is exponentially large in n and m. Our
hardness results imply the intractability of determining high-welfare CCE in games wherein the
underlying utilities are specified through a black box.
We denote the set of probability distributions over a set B by ∆(B). Given a distribution x
over the action profiles A, i.e., x ∈ ∆(A), we use up(x) for the expected utility of player p under
distribution x. Similarly, we write w(x) to denote the expected welfare under x.
Definition 1 (Correlated Equilibrium). A probability distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is said to be a corre-
lated equilibrium if for every player p and every actions i, j ∈ Ap we have∑
a−p∈A−p
[up(j, a−p)− up(i, a−p)]x(i, a−p) ≤ 0,
where (i, a−p) denotes an action profile in which player p plays action i and the other players play
a−p.
Definition 2 (Coarse Correlated Equilibrium). A probability distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is said to be a
coarse correlated equilibrium if for every player p and every action j ∈ Ap we have∑
a∈A
[up(j, a−p)− up(a)]x(a) ≤ 0,
6When there are multiple games under consideration within a single proof, we annotate the w to indicate to which
game it pertains.
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where (j, a−p) denotes an action profile in which player p plays action j and the other players play
a−p.
Along these lines, the definition of an approximate correlated equilibrium is as follows:
Definition 3 (ε-Correlated Equilibrium). A probability distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is said to be an
ε-correlated equilibrium if for every player p and every actions i, j ∈ Ap we have∑
a−p∈A−p
[up(j, a−p)− up(i, a−p)]x(i, a−p) ≤ ε.
Finally, we define ε-coarse correlated equilibrium.
Definition 4 (ε-Coarse Correlated Equilibrium). A probability distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is said to be
an ε-coarse correlated equilibrium if for every player p and every action i ∈ Ap we have∑
a∈A
[up(i, a−p)− up(a)]x(a) ≤ ε.
3 Hardness Results
In this section we show that, given a succinct game, it is NP-hard to compute a CCE with welfare
strictly better than the lowest-welfare CCE. In particular, we develop a reduction that shows that
the following decision problem is NP-hard.
Definition 5 (NT). Let Γ be an n-player m-action game with a succinct representation. NT is
defined to be the problem of determining whether Γ admits a coarse correlated equilibrium x such
that w(x) > w(x′). Here x′ denotes the worst CCE of Γ, in terms of social welfare w.
The hardness of NT implies that, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, any non-
trivial approximation of the the optimization problem (1) is impossible. Specifically, let x∗ denote
an optimal CCE of a game (i.e, x∗ is an optimal solution of the optimization problem (1)) and x′
be a CCE with minimum possible welfare. Write β := w(x′)/w(x∗), i.e., the ratio of the welfare
of the worst CCE to that of the best CCE. In games in which a CCE can be computed efficiently,
an efficient β-approximate solution of (1) is direct; we can simply return an arbitrary CCE. The
hardness of NT implies that no approximation factor better than β can be achieved in general
games. A proof of the NP-hardness of NT is detailed below.
max
n∑
p=1
up(x)
subject to x is a CCE (1)
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Theorem 1. NT is NP-hard in succinct multiplayer games.
Proof. We start with a succinct game G from a class of games in which computing a welfare-
maximizing action profile is NP-hard. Multiple examples of such classes of games are given in [21].
We reduce the problem of determining an optimal (welfare maximizing) action profile in G to
solving NT in a modified succinct game G′. When G is an n-player m-action succinct game, we
construct a modified game G′ by providing an additional action, bp, to each player p ∈ [n]. G′ is
therefore an n-player (m+ 1)-action game.
Let A denote the set of action profiles of game G; similarly, let A′ be the action profiles of G′.
Let up : A → [0, 1] and u′p : A′ → [0, 1] denote the utility of a player p in G and G′, respectively.
Along these lines, let w(·) and w′(·) represent the welfare of action profiles in G and G′, respectively.
Note that for every action profile a′ ∈ A′ \ A there exists at least one player p who is playing the
augmented action bp, i.e., a
′
p = bp.
Specifically, we start with the following NP-hard problem: given succinct game G and parameter
OPT, determine if there exists an action profile a ∈ A such that w(a) ≥ OPT.7 The utilities up
(and hence also w) are given as succinct input. Using them we define u′p as follows:
1. For every action profile a ∈ A, u′p(a) := w(a)/n. In other words, on action profiles that
belong to the original game we construct an identical-interest game.
2. For every action profile a′ ∈ A′ \A such that in a′ there is exactly one player p who is playing
the augmented action bp (i.e., a
′
p = bp for exactly one player p and a
′
q 6= bq for all q 6= p), set
u′p(a
′) := OPT/n and u′q(a
′) := 0 for all q 6= p.
3. For action profiles a′ ∈ A′ \A in which more than one player is playing the augmented action
bp, we set
u′p(a
′) =
{
ε/n if a′p = bp
0 otherwise
Here we select ε to satisfy: OPT > ε ≥ OPT/n.
Note that G′ is a succinct game. Specifically, if game G is succinct then, by definition, we
have a polynomial-size specification z for G. In addition, there exists an algorithm U that takes
as input z, p ∈ [n], and a ∈ A, and computes the utility of player p at any action profile a, i.e.,
up(a), in polynomial time. Now to obtain a succinct representation for G
′ we can use z and U (as
a subroutine) and compute utilities u′p for any player p and action profile a in polynomial time.
Say b denotes the action profile wherein each player is playing the augmented action, b :=
(b1, b2, . . . , bn). The definition of u
′
p implies that w
′(b) :=
∑n
p=1 u
′
p(b) =
∑n
p=1 ε/n = ε.
7Note that here we are considering an NP-hard decision problem and, hence, parameter OPT is part of the input.
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We will prove that there exists an action profile a ∈ A (i.e., an action profile in game G)
with w(a) ≥ OPT iff there exists a CCE x in G′ that satisfies w′(x) > w′(b). This shows that
determining if there exists a CCE x such that w′(x) > w′(b) is NP-hard.
To complete the hardness proof for NT we will show that action profile b is a pure Nash
equilibrium (and, therefore, a CCE), and that no other CCE in G′ has welfare w′ less than b.
Suppose a is an optimal action profile in game G, i.e., a ∈ A and w(a) ≥ OPT. Then a is in
fact a pure Nash equilibrium in G′. This follows from the fact that u′p(a) = w(a)/n ≥ OPT/n (G′
is identical interest on a ∈ A); hence (i) for any possible deviation aˆp 6= bp for player p we have
u′p(a) = w(a)/n ≥ w(aˆp, a−p)/n = u′p(aˆp, a−p). The first inequality holds since a is an optimal
action profile in G; (ii) for deviation bp, note that u
′
p(a) ≥ OPT/n = u′p(bp, a−p). Therefore,
no player can benefit (increase u′p) by unilaterally deviating from a, thereby proving that a is a
pure Nash equilibrium in G′. Overall, we get that if there exists an action profile a ∈ A with
w(a) ≥ OPT then there exists a CCE x (in particular, an optimal action profile a itself) in G′ that
satisfies w′(x) > w′(b). Recall that w′(a) ≥ OPT > ε = w′(b).
It remains to show that if there exists a CCE x such that w′(x) > w′(b) then there exists an
action profile a ∈ A with w(a) ≥ OPT. We will consider the set of action profiles in the support
of x that are also contained in A, i.e., Supp(x) ∩A. A useful observation is that for all a′ ∈ A′ \A
the welfare w′ satisfies: w′(a′) ≤ w′(b) (recall, ε ≥ OPT/n). This implies that Supp(x) ∩ A 6= φ;
otherwise, we would have w′(x) ≤ w′(b). Write π > 0 to denote the probability mass of x on the
set Supp(x) ∩A; specifically, π :=∑a∈A x(a).
Since x is a CCE, deviating to bp could not increase any player p’s expected utility:
w′(x) = Ea∼x[u
′
p(a)]
≥ Ea∼x[u′p(bp, a−p)].
We can rewrite the above inequality as follows: Ea∼x[u
′
p(a)− u′p(bp, a−p)] ≥ 0. Next we expand
in terms of conditional expectation
Ea′∼x
[
u′p(a
′)− u′p(bp, a′−p) | a ∈ A′ \A
] · (1− π) + Ea∼x [u′p(a)− u′p(bp, a−p) | a ∈ A] · π ≥ 0.
(2)
Note that for any action profile a′ ∈ A′ \A and each player p we have
u′p(a
′)− u′p(bp, a′−p) ≤ 0. (3)
Either a′p = bp, in which case u
′
p(a
′) − u′p(bp, a′−p) = 0; otherwise, a′p 6= bp and then u′p(a′) = 0 <
u′p(bp, a
′
−p).
This implies that the term Ea′∼x
[
u′p(a
′)− u′p(bp, a′−p) | a ∈ A′ \A
]
in inequality (2) is non-
positive for every player p. Therefore, the second term in (2), Ea∼x
[
u′p(a)− u′p(bp, a−p) | a ∈ A
]
,
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must be non-negative for every player p. Summing the second term over all players we get:
Ea∼x
[∑
p
(
u′p(a)− u′p(bp, a−p)
) | a ∈ A
]
· π ≥ 0. (4)
Recall that π > 0, i.e., there exists an action profile a ∈ A such that x(a) > 0. Therefore,
inequality (4) and the probabilistic method imply that there exists an action profile a ∈ A such
that
∑
p
(
u′p(a)− u′p(bp, a−p)
) ≥ 0. Since a ∈ A, u′p(bp, a−p) = OPT/n for all p. Hence, ∑p u′p(a) ≥∑
pOPT/n = OPT.
Thus, the existence of a CCE x in G′ such that w′(x) > w′(b) implies that there exists an action
profile a ∈ A with w(a) ≥ OPT.
To complete the proof, we need to show that b is a pure Nash equilibrium and that no other
CCE in G′ has welfare w′ less than b. The first part of this claim is direct. To prove the second
part, suppose by way of contradiction that there existed a CCE x′ in G′ such that w′(x′) < w′(b).
Therefore there would exist a player p such that
Ea′∼x′ [u
′
p(a
′)] < w′(b)/n
= ε/n. (5)
But, note that for any a′−p ∈ A′−p we have u′p(bp, a′−p) ≥ ε/n. This observation along with inequality
(5) implies that p would strictly benefit by unilaterally deviating to bp. Therefore, x
′ cannot be a
CCE. This completes the proof.
Remark: The proof of Theorem 1 can be directly adopted to establish hardness for CE as well.
In particular, the fact that any CE x satisfies the inequalities that define a CCE (see Definitions 1
and 2) can be used in the previous proof to show that it is NP-hard to determine a CE with welfare
strictly better than the worst possible CE.
In addition, we show below that the reduction given in the proof of Theorem 1 establishes a
hardness result for the egalitarian objective as well.
Theorem 2. In an n-player, m-action succinct game it is NP-hard to determine if there exists a
coarse correlated equilibrium x that satisfies minp u
′
p(x) > minp u
′
p(x
′), where u′p denotes the utility
of player p in the given game and x′ is the worst equilibrium with respect to the egalitarian objective,
i.e., x′ ∈ argminx′′∈CCE {minp u′p(x′′)}.
Sketch. Here we use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 1. Also, as in the previous proof,
we obtain a reduction from the following NP-hard problem: given succinct game G, determine if
there exists an action profile a ∈ A such that w(a) ≥ OPT.
Note that the action profile b in the constructed game G′ is the worst equilibrium with respect
to the egalitarian objective, i.e., b ∈ argminx′′∈CCE {minp u′p(x′′)}. We can establish this fact by
contradiction. In particular, if there existed a CCE x′ such that minp u
′
p(x
′) < minp u
′
p(b) = ε/n,
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then the player p that obtains the minimum utility under x′ could benefit by unilaterally deviating
to bp, contradicting the assumption that x
′ is a CCE.
To prove this theorem we show that the original game G has an action profile a with w(a) ≥ OPT
iff there exists a CCE x such that minp u
′
p(x) > minp u
′
p(b). The forward direction follows from
the fact that an optimal action profile a with welfare at least OPT is a pure Nash equilibrium
in G′. To establish the reverse direction we note that u′p(b) = ε/n for all p. Hence if a CCE x
satisfies minp u
′
p(x) > minp u
′
p(b), then its welfare w
′(x) is strictly greater than ε. In other words,
w′(x) > ε = w′(b). But, as shown in the previous proof, this strict inequality suffices to establish
the existence of an action profile for which w(a) ≥ OPT. Hence, we get the desired claim.
Remark: The reduction detailed above also proves that there does not exist a polynomial-time
algorithm that computes a Pareto-efficient CCE, unless P=NP. We can establish this result by
noting that a polynomial time algorithm, say A, that computes any Pareto-efficient CCE can be
used to determine whether there exists an action profile a that satisfies w(a) ≥ OPT; as before,
this suffices to prove the hardness result.
If A returns b as a Pareto-efficient equilibrium then we know that there does not exist an ac-
tion profile a such that w(a) ≥ OPT, since such an action profile would Pareto dominate b in G′:
u′p(a) > u
′
p(b) for all p. Also, note that if A returns a Pareto-efficient CCE x such that u′p(x) = u′p(b)
for all p, then again we get that b is Pareto-efficient. So this case is subsumed in the first one.
Recall that every CCE x of G′ satisfies u′p(x) ≥ u′p(b). Therefore, the final case entails A returning
a CCE x such that for some p we have u′p(x) > u
′
p(b). Hence, we get that w
′(x) > w′(b), which
again implies the existence of an action profile a with welfare w(a) ≥ OPT.
Remark: Theorems 1 and 2 hold for potential games. This follows from the fact that the
reduction used in the proof of these theorems in fact gives us a potential game. Specifically, a
potential function φ for the constructed game G′ is as follows:
1. φ(a) := w(a)/n for all a ∈ A.
2. For all action profiles a ∈ A′\A (i.e., in a at least one player is playing is playing its augmented
action bp), we set
φ(a) :=
OPT
n
+
(k − 1)ε
n
.
Here k is the number of players playing their corresponding augmented action bp in action
profile a, k = |{p | ap = bp}|.
A case analysis shows that φ is a potential function for G′. In particular, we will show that the
following equality holds for each player p and action profiles (ap, a−p) and (a
′
p, a−p):
u′p(ap, a−p)− u′p(a′p, a−p) = φ(ap, a−p)− φ(a′p, a−p) (6)
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Case I: Both (ap, a−p) and (a
′
p, a−p) are action profiles in A. Here we have u
′
p(ap, a−p) =
w(ap, a−p)/n = φ(ap, a−p) and u
′
p(a
′
p, a−p) = w(a
′
p, a−p)/n = φ(a
′
p, a−p). Hence, in this case
(6) holds.
Case II: Action profile (ap, a−p) ∈ A and (a′p, a−p) /∈ A (i.e., a′p = bp). Again, following
the definitions of utility u′p and potential function φ we get the equality (6): u
′
p(ap, a−p) =
w(ap, a−p)/n = φ(ap, a−p) along with u
′
p(a
′
p, a−p) = OPT/n = φ(a
′
p, a−p). The symmetric
case of (ap, a−p) /∈ A and (a′p, a−p) ∈ A is similarly addressed.
Case III: Both action profiles (ap, a−p) and (a
′
p, a−p) are not in A. If neither ap nor a
′
p is
equal to bp the utility u
′
p is zero under both the action profiles. Also, the number of players
playing their respective augmented actions bq is the same in (ap, a−p) and (a
′
p, a−p), hence
φ(ap, a−p) = φ(a
′
p, a−p). This enforces equality (6).
Now we consider the setting in which exactly one of ap or a
′
p is equal to bp; say ap = bp
(the other possibility (i.e., a′p = bp) holds by symmetry). Here, u
′
p(ap, a−p) = ε/n and
u′p(a
′
p, a−p) = 0. Say k ∈ [n] is the number of players playing their corresponding augmented
action in action profile (ap, a−p), then φ(ap, a−p) = OPT/n + (k − 1)ε/n and φ(a′p, a−p) =
OPT/n+ (k − 2)ε/n. Therefore, again, (6) holds.
3.1 Approximate Coarse Correlated Equilibrium
This section establishes the hardness of computing an approximate CCE that has high social welfare.
Specifically, we consider the problem of computing a 1
2n3
-CCE with welfare (1 + 1
n
) times better
than the welfare of the worst CCE. Note that there exist regret-based dynamics (c.f [24]) that
converge to the set of ε-CCE in time polynomial in 1/ε. Therefore, in polynomial time we can
compute a 1
2n3
-CCE. But, as the following theorem shows, it is unlikely that we can efficiently find
a 1
2n3
-CCE with any nontrivial welfare guarantee.
Note that in an n-player m-action game a 1
2n3m
-CE is guaranteed to be a 1
2n3
-CCE (see Defi-
nitions 3 and 4). Using this fact, one can directly use the proof given in this section to show that,
under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, there does not exist a polynomial time algorithm
that determines a 1
2n3m
-CE with any nontrivial welfare guarantee in succinct multiplayer games. It
is worth pointing out that in multiplayer games we can always find a 1
2n3m
-CE in polynomial time
(c.f [24]).
Definition 6 (ANT). Let Γ be an n-player m-action succinct game. ANT is defined to be the
problem of determining whether there exists a 1
2n3
-CCE x in Γ such that w(x) ≥ (1 + 1
n
)w(x′),
where x′ denotes the worst CCE of Γ, in terms of social welfare w.
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Theorem 3. In succinct multiplayer games, ANT is NP-hard under randomized reductions: if ANT
admits a polynomial-time algorithm then NP admits a polynomial-time randomized algorithm.
Proof. We will extend the construction presented in the proof of Theorem 1. We start with a
game G from a class of games in which it is NP-hard to compute an action profile with welfare
within one of the optimal. That is, in G it is NP-hard to compute an action profile a such that
w(a) ≥ maxa′∈Aw(a′)−1; note that this is a fairly modest hardness of approximation requirement.
Write OPT = maxa∈A w(a). Below we develop a polynomial-time randomized algorithm that
uses an algorithm for ANT to compute an action profile a that satisfies w(a) ≥ OPT − 1. This
establishes the stated claim.
To find the desired action profile a, we need a parameter τ that satisfies τ ∈ [OPT − 1,OPT].
Since the utilities in G are normalized between 0 and 1, we have OPT ≤ n. Therefore, one of the
values in {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} will give τ ∈ [OPT− 1,OPT], and we can simply search exhaustively.
Applying the same transformations as in the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain the succinct game
G′. While setting utilities in G′ we use ε = (τ + 1)/n, where parameter τ ∈ [OPT − 1,OPT].
Therefore, we have OPT
n
≤ ε ≤ OPT+1
n
.
We assume that OPT ≥ 1, else finding an action profile a such that w(a) ≥ OPT− 1 is trivial.
Also, we can assume that n ≥ 4; recall that for a constant number of players, an optimal CCE
can be computed in polynomial time. The following inequality holds under these assumptions:
OPT ≥ (1 + 1
n
)
OPT+1
n
.
As before, the action profile b is a pure Nash equilibrium, and in fact is a CCE with minimum
social welfare.
First, note that an optimal action profile a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈Aw(a) of G is a pure Nash equilibrium
(hence, a 1
2n3
-CCE) in G′. Also, we have w′(a∗) = w(a∗) = OPT. The boundw′(a∗) ≥ (1 + 1
n
)
w′(b)
follows from the following chain of inequalities: OPT ≥ (1 + 1
n
)
OPT+1
n
≥ (1 + 1
n
)
ε =
(
1 + 1
n
)
w′(b).
Thus we get that there exists a 1
2n3
-CCE with welfare strictly better than (1 + 1/n)w′(b). This
overall ensures that a polynomial-time algorithm for ANT is guaranteed to return a solution. Next
we show that any such returned solution can be used to compute an action profile a that satisfies
w(a) ≥ OPT− 1.
The fact that w′(a) ≤ w′(b) for all a ∈ A′ \A and the inequality w′(x) ≥ (1+ 1
n
)w′(b) imply that∑
a∈A w
′(a)x(a) ≥ 1
n
w′(b). Recall that w′(b) = ε ≥ OPT
n
. Therefore,
∑
a∈A w
′(a)x(a) ≥ 1
n2
OPT.
Since w(a) = w′(a) for all a ∈ A, we have maxa∈A w′(a) = OPT. Therefore, π :=
∑
a∈A x(a) ≥ 1n2 .
Given that x is a 1
2n3
-approximate CCE, analogous to inequality (4) here we have
Ea∼x
[∑
p
(
u′p(a)− u′p(bp, a−p)
) | a ∈ A
]
· π ≥ − 1
2n2
. (7)
Since π ≥ 1
n2
, inequality (7) implies Ea∼x
[∑
p
(
u′p(a)− u′p(bp, a−p)
) | a ∈ A] ≥ −1/2.
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For all a ∈ A and p ∈ [n], we have u′p(bp, a−p) = OPT/n. Therefore, we get the following bound
on the conditional expectation Ea∼x
[∑
p u
′
p(a) | a ∈ A
]
≥ OPT − 1/2. For all action profiles∑
p u
′
p(a) = w
′(a) ≤ OPT ≤ n. This implies that in the conditional distribution Prx(a | a ∈ A) the
probability mass on action profiles that satisfy w′(a) ≥ OPT− 1 is at least 12n .
Therefore, with high probability, we can obtain an action profile that satisfies w′(a) ≥ OPT− 1
by drawing polynomially many independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from the
conditional distribution Prx(a | a ∈ A). Since π =
∑
a∈A x(a) ≥ 1n2 , we can obtain polynomially
many i.i.d. samples from the conditional distribution by drawing polynomially many i.i.d. samples
from x. This overall gives us a polynomial-time randomized algorithm to find an action profile that
satisfies w(a) = w′(a) ≥ OPT− 1. Hence, the stated claim follows.
In this section we considered approximate CCE with a specific approximation factor, i.e., we estab-
lished hardness for 1
2n3
-CCE. This was for ease of presentation, and in fact hardness of a param-
eterized version of ANT can be obtained along the lines of the given proof. In particular, we can
show that for any δ ∈
[
1
poly(n) , 1
]
it is computationally hard to compute a δ
2n2
-CCE with welfare
greater than (1 + δ)w(x′), where, again, x′ denotes the worst CCE.
4 Computing Approximate Correlated Equilibria with Near-Optimal
Welfare
In this section, we develop an algorithmic framework for computing an ε-CE with welfare additively
ε close to the optimal. The ideas presented in the section can be easily modified to find an ε-CCE
with welfare additively ε close to the optimal CCE.8
Our framework is based on a novel extension of Blackwell’s condition, which is used in the
analysis of no-regret algorithms (see, e.g., [24]). The idea here is to define, for each action profile a ∈
A, a vector r(a) whose components list the regret of each player at action profile a. Specifically, for
each player p ∈ [n] and action j ∈ [m] there is component in r(a) that is equal to up(j, a−p)−up(a);
note that this quantity is the the regret of player p at action profile a with respect to deviation j.
The regret vector r(a) has an additional component that is equal to the the difference between the
optimal welfare and the welfare of action profile a.
Intuitively, the components of r(a) are defined to ensure that x∗ is an optimal CE if and only
if the following component-wise inequalities hold: Ea∼x∗ [r(a)] ≤ 0. Moreover, to find the desired
approximate CE it suffices to determine a distribution x ∈ ∆(A) that satisfies Ea∼x[r(a)] ≤ ε. Using
an extension of Blackwell’s condition (see inequality (8)), we develop an algorithm for finding such
a distribution x. In particular, via a gradient-descent like argument, we show that action profiles
8In order to find an approximate CCE with near-optimal welfare we can define a different regret vector than the
one under consideration in this section, whose components are equal to the regret terms that appear in the definition
of a CCE. Note that the regret vector for the CCE case is nm+ 1 dimensional.
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satisfying the extended Blackwell condition can be used to determine the desired approximate CE
x; see proof of Theorem 4 for details.
It turns out that finding an action profile that satisfies the extended Blackwell condition corre-
sponds to computing an additive approximation of a modified-welfare maximization problem (see
Definition 7). This overall gives us an algorithmic framework that reduces the problem of deter-
mining an approximate CE with near optimal welfare to the problem of additive approximating a
modified-welfare maximization problem. We instantiate this framework in the context of aggregative
games in the next section.
Formally, we begin by defining a d = nm(m − 1) + 1 dimensional regret vector r(a) for each
action profile a ∈ A. The first nm(m − 1) components of r(a) are indexed by triples (p, i, j)
for player p ∈ [n] and distinct actions i, j ∈ [m]. The (p, i, j)th component of r(a) is equal to
up(j, a−p) − up(a) if ap = i, and is zero otherwise. That is, the (p, i, j)th component is the regret
that player p experiences at action profile a by not playing action j. The last (dth) component of
r(a) is equal to w∗−w(a). Here w∗ denotes the optimal welfare over the set of correlated equilibria,
i.e., w∗ := max{w(x) | x is a correlated equilibrium}.
Write x∗ to denote the welfare-optimal CE, i.e., w∗ = w(x∗). Note that for x∗ we have that
Ea∼x∗ [r(a)] ≤ 0 holds component-wise . Now, a useful observation is that for any scaling vector
y ∈ Rd+ with nonnegative components, we have Ea∼x∗ [yT r(a)] ≤ 0. Via the probabilistic method,
we get that for any y ∈ Rd+ there exists an action profile a∗ such that
yT r(a∗) ≤ 0 (8)
Inequality (8) can be thought of as an extension of Blackwell’s condition.
This inequality leads us to the objective of maximizing a modified welfare function that is
defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Modified Welfare). Given scaling vector y ∈ Rd+ (where the first nm(m− 1) compo-
nents of y are indexed by (p, i, j) for player p ∈ [n] and actions i, j ∈ [m] and we refer to the last
component of y as yd), we define modified utilities u˜
y
p and modified welfare w˜y as follows:
u˜yp(a) := ydup(a) +
∑
j∈Ap
y(p,ap,j)(up(a)− up(j, a−p)) (9)
w˜y(a) :=
∑
p
u˜yp(a). (10)
For ease of presentation, when y is clear from context we will drop it from the superscript of u˜yp
and w˜y.
Definition 8 (Modified-Welfare Maximization Problem). Given a multi-player game and vector
y ∈ Rd+, the modified-welfare maximization problem (MWMP) is to compute an action profile a of
the game that maximizes modified welfare w˜y, i.e., the objective is to obtain argmaxa∈A w˜
y(a).
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Note that for any vector y ∈ Rd+ and any action profile a we have yT r(a) = ydw∗ − w˜y(a). As
argued above, for any vector y with non-negative components there exists an action profile a∗ that
satisfies (8). In particular, a∗ satisfies w˜y(a∗) ≥ ydw∗. Therefore, given a vector y, we can compute
an action profile that satisfies (8) by solving an instance of MWMP specified via y. Moreover,
an α-additive approximation of MWMP is guaranteed to produce an action profile that satisfies
yT r(a) ≤ α.
Below we show that (additively) approximating this welfare maximization problem is sufficient
to obtain an approximate CE with near-optimal welfare. The hardness result established earlier
(see Theorem 3) implies that MWMP cannot be efficiently approximated in general succinct games.
However, it is possible for us to approximate MWMP in specific classes of games; in particular, the
next subsection details an efficient algorithm to approximate MWMP in aggregative games.
Specifically, given a game and vector y ∈ Rd+, write M(y) to denote an O
(
ε4
n4m8
)
-additive
approximation for MWMP with respect to the specified y. Here, ε is an approximation parameter.
Note that an additive approximation a =M(y) satisfies yT r(a) ≤ O
(
ε4
n4m8
)
.
Our algorithm, A, for computing an approximate CE is given below. A requires access to an
additive approximation M(y) for polynomially many ys. Note that the ys considered during A’s
execution satisfy y ∈ [0, n]d.
Algorithm for computing ε-correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare
Given: an algorithm for computing additive approximation M(y) in an n-player m-action game;
Return: ε-correlated equilibrium of the game with welfare at least w∗ − ε.
1: Set a0 to be an arbitrary action profile of the game and N = O
(
n2m4
ε2
)
.
2: Let N denote the negative orthant and ΠN (v) denote the Euclidean projection of vector v onto
N .
3: Initialize average regret vector r¯0 = r(a
0).
4: for t = 1 to N do
5: Set y = r¯t−1−ΠN (r¯t−1). {Note that the components of y are nonnegative and their magnitude
is no more than n}
6: Set at =M(y). {Note that at satisfies yT r(at) ≤ O
(
ε4
n4m8
)
= O
(
1
N2
)}
7: Set r¯t =
t
t+1 r¯t−1 +
1
t+1r(a
t).
8: end for
9: Return the empirical distribution over the multiset {a0, a1, a2, . . . , aN}.
Theorem 4. For a given n-player m-action game, algorithm A computes an ε-correlated equilib-
rium with welfare at least w∗ − ε. Here w∗ denotes the optimal welfare over the set of correlated
equilibria of the given game. Moreover, if in the given game additive approximations M(y) for
y ∈ [0, n]d can be computed in polynomial (in n, m, and 1/ε) time, then A runs in polynomial time
as well.
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Proof. First we establish the stated running-time bound for Algorithm A. Note that A iterates
N = O
(
n2m4
ε2
)
times. Therefore, if additive approximationsM(y) can be computed in polynomial
time, then A runs in polynomial time as well.
Next we establish that A computes an approximate correlated equilibrium with high welfare.
Write x to denote the distribution returned by A, i.e., x is the empirical distribution over the multi-
set of action profiles {a0, a1, a2, . . . , aN}. We will show that x satisfies Ea∼x[r(a)] ≤ ε, component-
wise. This inequality and the definition of regret vector r(a) imply that x is an ε-correlated
equilibrium with welfare at least w∗ − ε.
Note that Step (7) of algorithm A ensures that r¯N =
∑N
t=1
1
N
r(at) = Ea∼x[r(a)]. Here, the
second equality follows from the fact that x is the empirical distribution over action profiles
a1, a2, . . . , aN .
Write d(r,N ) to denote the Euclidean distance between vector r and the negative orthant N .
The proof proceeds by showing that d(r¯N ,N ) is no more than ε. This implies that component-wise
r¯N is no more than ε, and hence we get the desired claim Ea∼x[r(a)] ≤ ε. Recall that r¯t−1 denotes
the average regret vector considered in the (t−1)th iteration of the algorithm and ΠN (r¯t−1) denotes
the Euclidean projection of this vector onto the negative orthant. The vector ΠN (r¯t−1) is found by
replacing the positive components of r¯t−1 by 0, i.e., the ith component of the projection (ΠN (r¯t−1))i
is equal to min{0, (r¯t−1)i}. We bound the Euclidean distance of r¯t from the negative orthant as
follows:
d2(r¯t,N ) ≤ d2(r¯t,ΠN (r¯t−1))
=
∥∥∥∥ tt+ 1 r¯t−1 + 1t+ 1r(at)−ΠN (r¯t−1)
∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
(
t
t+ 1
)2
‖r¯t−1 −ΠN (r¯t−1)‖22 +
(
1
t+ 1
)2
‖r(at)−ΠN (r¯t−1)‖22
+
2t
t+ 1
(r¯t−1 −ΠN (r¯t−1))T
(
r(at)−ΠN (r¯t−1)
)
(11)
Next we bound the terms on the right-hand side of equality (11). The fact that the utilities
of the players are between 0 and 1 implies that for any action profile a the regret vector satisfies
‖r(a)‖22 ≤ 2n2m4. Also, ‖r¯t−1‖22 ≤ 2n2m4, since r¯t−1 is an average of regret vectors. Therefore,
using the triangle inequality, we get the following bound for the second term in (11),
(
1
t+1
)2 ‖r(at)−
ΠN (r¯t−1)‖22 ≤
(
2nm2
t+1
)2
.
Step (6) ensures that (r¯t−1 −ΠN (r¯t−1))T r(at) is no more than O
(
1
N2
)
. In addition, note that
the nonzero components of vector r¯t−1 −ΠN (r¯t−1) are the positive components of vector r¯t−1, and
on the other hand the nonzero components of vector ΠN (r¯t−1) are the negative components of r¯t−1.
Therefore, we have (r¯t−1 −ΠN (r¯t−1))T ΠN (r¯t−1) = 0. Overall, we get the following bound on the
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third term in (11):
2t
t+ 1
(r¯t−1 −ΠN (r¯t−1))T
(
r(at)−ΠN (r¯t−1)
) ≤ O( 1
N2
)
≤ 1
(t+ 1)2
Using the bounds mentioned above and multiplying equation (11) by (t+ 1)2 we get
(t+ 1)2d2(r¯t,N ) ≤ t2d2(r¯t−1,N ) +O(n2m4).
This leads to a telescoping sum for 1 ≤ t ≤ N that overall gives us
N2d2(r¯N ,N ) ≤ d2(r¯1,N ) +O(n2m4N). (12)
Note that ‖r¯1‖22 ≤ O(n2m4), therefore d2(r¯1,N ) ≤ O(n2m4). Hence, inequality (12) gives
N2d2(r¯N ,N ) ≤ O(n2m4N). In other words, d(r¯N ,N ) ≤ O(nm2/
√
N). Given that N = O
(
n2m4
ε2
)
,
we get that the Euclidean distance between r¯N and the negative orthant is at most ε, i.e., d(r¯N ,N ) ≤
ε.
As discussed above, the last inequality implies that Ea∼x[r(a)] ≤ ε, where x is the distribution
returned by the algorithm A. Overall, following the argument outlined above, we get the desired
claim.
Remark: We can adapt this algorithmic framework to the egalitarian objective or Pareto efficiency,
instead of welfare maximization.
For the egalitarian objective, for each action profile, instead of regret vector r(a), we can
consider (nm(m − 1) + n)-dimensional vector ρ(a). The first nm(m − 1) components of ρ(a) and
r(a) are the same. But, the last n components of ρ(a) are set equal to w′ − up(a) for each p ∈ [n].
Here w′ is the optimal value of the egalitarian objective, w′ := argmaxx∈CE minp up(x). Working
with ρ(a) and the corresponding modified-welfare function, we can obtain an ε-CE x that satisfies
minp up(x) ≥ w′ − ε.
To find an approximate correlated equilibrium that is nearly Pareto efficient, we pick a specific
player q and replace the last component of the regret vector r(a) by w′′ − uq(a). Here w′′ :=
argmaxx∈CE uq(x). In this case, we can consider the relevant modified-welfare function and overall
obtain an ε-CE that satisfies uq(x) ≥ w′′ − ε. Since there does not exist a CE wherein the utility
of q is ε more than uq(x), we get that x is ε-Pareto efficient.
4.1 Aggregative Games
This section presents a polynomial-time additive-approximation algorithm for MWMP in aggrega-
tive games. An n-player m-action aggregative game with action profiles A is specified by an
aggregator function S : A → [−W,W ]k and utility-defining functions vp : Ap × [−W,W ]k → [0, 1].
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The function S serves as a sufficient statistic for the utilities of the player; specifically, the utility of
player p at action profile a (i.e., up(a)) is equal to vp(ap, S(a)). Note that here the utility depends on
the action of the player, ap, and the aggregated vector, S(a). In aggregative games, the function S
is additively separable; in particular, there exist vectors fp(ap) ∈ [−W ′,W ′]k for each player p ∈ [n]
and action ap ∈ Ap such that for any action profile a ∈ A we have the following component-wise
equality: S(a) =
∑
p fp(ap). Here, the dimension k is assumed to be a fixed constant and W and
W ′ are polynomially bounded in n and m.
Along the lines of prior work (see [3, 9]), we consider the setting in which the influence of the
aggregator on the utilities is bounded: |vp(ap, s) − vp(ap, s′)| ≤ ‖s − s′‖∞ for all players p ∈ [n],
actions ap ∈ Ap, and vectors s, s′ ∈ [−W,W ]k. The assumption that k is a fixed constant can be
mute without this bounded influence property.
Recall that modified utilities u˜yp(a) are defined in terms of the utilities up(a); see Definition 7. In
this section we will only consider vectors y whose components are linearly bounded, i.e., y ∈ [0, n]d;
in order to apply Theorem 4 it suffices to consider such linearly-bounded vectors.
We begin by discretizing the aggregating vectors fp(ap) such that their components are mul-
tiples of parameter δ, which will be set appropriately. That is, for all p ∈ [n] and ap ∈ Ap, the
components of vector fp(ap) are rounded to the nearest multiple of δ. Note that component-wise
the vectors fp(ap) are polynomially bounded; hence, a polynomially small δ ensures that even after
discretization for all action profiles a, the aggregated value S(a) remains within O
(
ε4
poly(n,m)
)
—
under the ℓ∞ norm—of the original (undiscretized) value. The bounded influence assumption,
|vp(ap, s) − vp(ap, s′)| ≤ ‖s − s′‖∞ and the fact that y ∈ [0, n]d ensures that the discretization
process does not change the modified utility w˜y(a) by more than O
(
ε4
poly(n,m)
)
, for any action
profile a. Overall, this implies that (with a polynomially small δ) if we compute an action profile
a′ that maximizes w˜y with the discretized aggregator function then a′ is an O
(
ε4
n4m8
)
-additive
approximation for MWMP with the original (undiscretized) aggregator function.
Throughout the remainder of the section we will work with the discretized aggregator. Now, all
the discretized vectors fp(vp)s are contained in
{
0,±δ,±2δ,±3δ, . . . ,±
⌈
W ′
δ
⌉
δ
}k
. Write G to denote
the k-dimensional grid defined as follows: G := {∑pq=1 fq(aq) | for all p ∈ [n] and each aq ∈ Aq}.
Since δ is polynomially small we have |G| = (nm
ε
)O(k)
. Also, for all action profiles a ∈ A, the
discretized aggregator function value S(a) is contained in G.
We develop a dynamic program that works over G and computes an action profile that maximizes
the modified welfare w˜y. As discussed above, this gives us an O
(
ε4
n4m8
)
-additive approximation for
MWMP.
Our main result of this section is that an additive approximation for MWMP can be computed
efficiently when the scaling vector y is contained in [0, n]d.
Theorem 5. Given an n-playerm-action aggregative game and a scaling vector y ∈ [0, n](nm(m−1)+1),
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an O
(
ε4
n4m8
)
-additive approximation for the
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MWMP instance specified via y.
Proof. Throughout the proof we work with the modified welfare function w˜y that is specified by the
discretized aggregator function. In particular, via a dynamic program we will compute an action
profile that maximizes w˜y. As mentioned above, this gives the desired additive-approximation
guarantee.
For each vector s ∈ G we will maximize the modified welfare w˜y function over the set of action
profiles A(s) := {a ∈ A | S(a) = s} in polynomial time. Write a∗ to denote an action profile that
maximizes w˜y. Discretization ensures that S(a∗) ∈ G. Also, the fact that the cardinality of G is
polynomially bounded implies that efficiently optimizing over A(s) for each s ∈ G gives an action
profile that maximizes w˜y in polynomial time.
The remainder of the proof details an algorithm that, given vector s ∈ G, solves the following
optimization problem in polynomial time: argmaxa∈A(s) w˜
y(a).
First, we define modified utility function v˜p(ap, s) in terms of the given functions vp(ap, s).
Recall that the vector y is d = nm(m− 1) + 1 dimensional and its first nm(m− 1) components are
indexed by triples (p, i, j) with p ∈ [n] and distinct i, j ∈ [m]. Using vector y as a parameter we
define,
v˜yp(ap, s) := yd vp(ap, s) +
∑
j∈Ap
y(p,ap,j) · [vp(ap, s)− vp(j, s − fp(ap) + fp(j)]
A key observation is that for any action profile a, if s = S(a) then u˜yp(a) = v˜
y
p(ap, s) and, hence,
w˜y(a) =
∑n
p=1 v˜
y(ap, s). Therefore, by the definition of A(s), for all a ∈ A(s) the following equality
holds w˜y(a) =
∑n
p=1 v˜
y(ap, s). Hence, argmaxa∈A(s)
∑n
p=1 v˜
y(ap, s) is equal to argmaxa∈A(s) w˜
y(a).
We solve argmaxa∈A(s)
∑n
p=1 v˜
y(ap, s) via a dynamic program that fills a matrix M(p, s
′) in-
dexed by p ∈ [n] and s′ ∈ G. In particular, M(p, s′) is set equal to maxa1,a2,...,ap{
∑p
q=1 v˜
y(aq, s) |∑p
q=1 fq(aq) = s
′}. Here, the entry M(n, s) is equal to the target optimal value maxa∈A(s) w˜y(a).
We can initialize M(1, s′) by going over actions in A1; specifically, M(1, s
′) = maxa1{v˜y(a1, s) |
f1(a1) = s
′}. In general, we use the recurrence relationM(p, s′) = maxap,s′′{v˜y(ap, s)+M(p−1, s′′) |
fp(ap) + s
′′ = s′} to complete the matrix. A direct inductive argument proves the correctness of
this dynamic program.
Since, |G| is polynomially bounded, the size of the matrix is also polynomially bounded. Overall,
the dynamic program runs in polynomial time and the stated claim follows.
Theorem 5 shows that the additive approximation required in Theorem 4 can be computed
in polynomial time. Therefore, the two theorems together imply that in aggregative games an
approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare can be computed in polynomial time.
Corollary 1. In n-player m-action aggregative games an ε-correlated equilibrium with welfare
w∗ − ε can be computed in time polynomial in n, m, and 1/ε. Here w∗ denotes the optimal welfare
over the set of correlated equilibria of the given game.
19
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Nikhil Bansal for helpful discussions. This work was supported by NSF grants
CNS-0846025, CCF-1101470, and CNS-1254169, along with a Microsoft research faculty fellow-
ship, a Google faculty research award, and a Linde/SISL postdoctoral fellowship. Katrina Ligett
gratefully acknowledges the support of the Charles Lee Powell Foundation.
References
[1] Daron Acemoglu and Martin Kaae Jensen. Aggregate comparative statics. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 81:27–49, 2013.
[2] Robert J Aumann. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of mathe-
matical Economics, 1(1):67–96, 1974.
[3] Yakov Babichenko. Best-reply dynamic in large aggregative games. Available at SSRN 2210080,
2013.
[4] Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, and Yishay Mansour. Circumventing the price of anarchy:
Leading dynamics to good behavior. SIAM Journal on Computing, 42(1):230–264, 2013.
[5] Vittorio Bilo, Michele Flammini, and Luca Moscardelli. The price of stability for undirected
broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant. In Foundations of Computer
Science (FOCS), 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on, pages 638–647. IEEE, 2013.
[6] Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour. From external to internal regret. The Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 8:1307–1324, 2007.
[7] Moses Charikar, Howard Karloff, Claire Mathieu, Joseph Seffi Naor, and Michael Saks. Online
multicast with egalitarian cost sharing. In Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on
Parallelism in algorithms and architectures, pages 70–76. ACM, 2008.
[8] Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng. Settling the complexity of computing two-player
nash equilibria. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 56(3):14, 2009.
[9] Rachel Cummings, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth, and Zhiwei Steven Wu. Privacy and truthful
equilibrium selection for aggregative games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.7740, 2014.
[10] Dean P Foster and Rakesh V Vohra. Asymptotic calibration. Biometrika, 85(2):379–390, 1998.
[11] James Hannan. Approximation to bayes risk in repeated play. Contributions to the Theory of
Games, 3:97–139, 1957.
20
[12] Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equi-
librium. Econometrica, 68(5):1127–1150, 2000.
[13] Martin Kaae Jensen. Aggregative games and best-reply potentials. Economic Theory, 43(1):45–
66, 2010.
[14] Albert Xin Jiang and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated
equilibrium in compact games. Games and Economic Behavior, 2013.
[15] Robert Kleinberg, Georgios Piliouras, and E´va Tardos. Multiplicative updates outperform
generic no-regret learning in congestion games. In Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM
symposium on Theory of computing, pages 533–542. ACM, 2009.
[16] Euiwoong Lee and Katrina Ligett. Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost
sharing games. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce,
pages 607–620. ACM, 2013.
[17] Nick Littlestone and Manfred K Warmuth. The weighted majority algorithm. Information
and computation, 108(2):212–261, 1994.
[18] Jason R Marden, H Peyton Young, and Lucy Y Pao. Achieving pareto optimality through
distributed learning. In CDC, pages 7419–7424, 2012.
[19] John Nash. Non-cooperative games. Annals of mathematics, pages 286–295, 1951.
[20] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V Vazirani. Algorithmic game theory.
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[21] Christos H Papadimitriou and Tim Roughgarden. Computing correlated equilibria in multi-
player games. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 55(3):14, 2008.
[22] Aviad Rubinstein. Inapproximability of nash equilibrium. Proceedings of the forty-seventh
annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2015.
[23] Yang Song, Starsky HY Wong, and Kang-Won Lee. Optimal gateway selection in multi-
domain wireless networks: a potential game perspective. In Proceedings of the 17th annual
international conference on Mobile computing and networking, pages 325–336. ACM, 2011.
[24] H Peyton Young. Strategic learning and its limits. Oxford University Press, 2004.
21
